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Interdiction of terrorist funds has become a priority for intergovernmental 
cooperation. Logically, this initiative should affect SDM financing as well as conflict 
funding more generally  – particularly where incumbent states can outlaw such 
movements. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting 
of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to 
the international financial system, have had limited success. This is mainly due to 
economic disincentives for the disclosure of the identity and purpose of transacting 
agents, particularly those using correspondent banking services, informal money 
transfer networks and offshore financial centres. Solutions should be based on 
positive incentives for disclosure, and could include trans-border withholding taxes 
on transactions with unregulated clients and the provision of affordable transfer 
systems for emigrants. But this in turn would require a clear and practicable 
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Since the attack of 11 September 2001 on the USA, the interdiction of terrorist funds 
has occupied the attention of international organisations and national governments 
throughout the world, and has been defined as a central element of the ‘war on terror’. 
During the succeeding twelve months trans-border cooperation on the provision of 
financial information was strengthened, led by Washington and London in their 
double role as strategic security allies and regulators of the two major global financial 
centres. In this period, some 166 countries issued orders blocking the terrorist assets, 
but only US $112 million of funds were frozen.
1 However, closer examination reveals 
that it proved very difficult to ensure timely reporting of the financial transactions of 




Logically, this initiative should affect SDM financing as well as conflict funding more 
generally – particularly where the inevitable attempts by incumbent states to outlaw 
such movements are supported by international organisations.  A ‘self-determination 
movement’ (SDM) in this context is understood to be an organised movement to 
fundamentally change the nature of a nation state in order to permit those represented 
by the movement to gain greater autonomy. This change may take the form of either 
the creation of a separate geographical entity or the replacement of the existing state 
by a fundamentally different social order. The former case, of separation, is usually 
identified with a particular ethnic group that inhabits the region in question, a group 
that demands separation in order to escape repression by the incumbent state (itself 
often dominated by a distinct ethnic group, majority or minority). Clear examples of 
this are East Timor, Northern Ireland, Eritrea and the former Yugoslavia. The latter 
case of replacement, refers to much more than a change of government (albeit by 
violent means), but rather a change in the social ‘constitution’ – during much of the 
twentieth century this involved the construction of socialism (e.g. China, Cuba), but 
was then succeeded by movements to replace communism by capitalism (e.g. Poland, 
Rumania), and dictatorship and military rule by democracy (e.g. Philippines). There 
are of course cases of ethnic overthrows of whole states (e.g. South Africa, 
Zimbabwe) and the establishment of theocratic states (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan) has also 
become a significant phenomenon.  
 
This definition of the SDM, therefore, implies a widespread support among the social 
group in question and fundamental change as the objective. It thus excludes violent 
actions by small groups of activists on the one hand (e.g. the Weathermen), and 
attempts to capture the state by military means in order to replace the leadership (e.g. 
Sierra Leone). Terrorism proper is understood to be violent actions by non-state 
groups against civilian targets for the purpose of achieving political ends: SDMs may 
or may not engage in terrorism in this strict sense. Indeed most SDMs try to avoid 
actions against civilians as this would reduce their support. Moreover, non-democratic 
states may (and often do) engage in illegal repression of civilians that is effectively a 
form of terrorism.          
 
The incumbent state will logically oppose the attempt to overthrow its fundamental 
constitution or to separate part of its territory.  This usually involves the use of armed 
force, to which the SDM may respond equally with armed actions. These actions are 
inevitably termed ‘crimes’ or ‘terrorism’ by the state, although of course other states QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 3 
   
may support the SDM, turning a blind eye to its the armed activities or even 
supporting them as ‘freedom fighters’. Indeed it is very difficult if not impossible for 
an SDM to be sustained without the implicit or explicit support of another state – if 
only as a safe haven.    In consequence, a key objective of the incumbent state and its 
allies is to define opposition SDMs as international terrorists.  
 
The need for considerable and continuous funding, and the need to transfer these 
funds internationally, imposes an effective budget constraint on non-state conflict 
participants SDMs as well as terrorism proper – that can reduce the number and 
intensity of attacks as effectively as direct police action (Sandler et al., 1983). Second, 
there are considerable externalities to other states arising from the interdiction of 
international terrorism or the containment of SDMs in any one territory, while the 
costs are local, so that there are potential gains from international cooperation in this 
field and a temptation – particularly for small states – to engage in free-riding (Lee, 
1988).     
 
Within the limitations of publicly available information
3, this paper sets out to explore 
this issue from the viewpoint of the economics of financial regulation.  The key issue 
is the geostrategic need for more information on the identity of transactors and the 
ability to freeze/expropriate assets and/or gain information on other related activities. 
However, the regulators’ problem is that the large unregulated flows generated by 
broadly legal activities such as tax avoidance and migrant remittances provide cover 
for crime-related transactions (Johnson, 2001).   To the extent that the loss of secrecy 
and increased reporting requirements involves a loss in efficiency of the market as a 
whole by increasing transactions costs, this must be set against the less tangible global 
welfare gain of increased security. The obvious parallel here is with the logic of the 
trade-off between efficiency and stability in financial markets which brings about the 
need for prudential regulation to prevent systemic risk, and thus the obligation to 
provide proprietary information to regulators in exchange for the licence to operate 
(Goodhart et al., 1998).  
 
In economic theory, financial intermediaries undertake the task of monitoring the 
firms to whom they lend on behalf of the households who deposit funds with them 
(Diamond 1984). These intermediaries enjoy scale and learning economies in this 
activity, and possess privileged information about their debtors.   In consequence they 
are in a unique position to provide accurate information on their clients to the 
regulatory authorities without undue cost. Further, financial intermediaries possess 
considerable information on their creditors, particularly when they provide a wide 
range of financial services and thus build up a picture of clients’ assets and activities. 
Traditionally, therefore, financial intermediaries in OECD countries have worked 
closely with national law enforcement authorities in the detection of criminal 
activities – particularly the transfer of criminal proceeds and the evasion of tax 
obligations. However, over the last decade the competitive forces associated with 
financial globalisation have tended to undermine this altered this relationship: on the 
one hand, banks have increasingly moved away from direct lending towards the 
management of capital market assets, and so there is much less non-financial 
information available on borrowers; on the other hand, high net worth individuals 
regard secrecy as a key service, and in the absence of capital controls can move funds 
rapidly to another jurisdiction if this is not provided.  
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The demand for secrecy ranges from concealing assets from other family members or 
business associates, through tax evasion to laundering the proceeds of criminal 
activities. International law enforcement, however, require information about 
depositors and users of financial services. This information asymmetry is precisely the 
reverse of that analysed in the financial literature, where it is assumed that the lender 
has insufficient information to properly monitor the borrower (Hiller, 1997). Further, 
in the case of interdiction of cross-border terrorist funds, there is the additional 
complication that the origin of the funds can be fully legitimate (e.g. a scholarship 
fund) and their use also (e.g. hotel bills) until the attack takes place.    
 
This paper is structured as follows. Attempts to detect and interdict illegal financial 
flows related to the funding of trans-border terrorism are built on existing systems of 
reporting the use of financial systems for illegal purposes. This foundation is 
examined in Section 2, which covers multilateral coordination on financial 
interdiction, the role of unregulated money transfer networks (MTNs) and the 
problem of offshore financial centres (OFCs).   The limitations of this approach are 
shown to derive from the bias of economic incentives towards less rather than more 
disclosure. Section 3 examines the multilateral and unilateral attempts during the 
twelve months after the attack of September 2001 to strengthen regulatory controls on 
international banking and to regulate informal transfer systems. The effect of this 
effort on self-determination movements is examined in Section 4, from which it is 
clear that SDMs have merely been treated as terrorist organisations according to the 
definitions of incumbent states. Section 5 concludes that unless market incentives 
work with – rather than against – regulatory disclosure, there is little prospect of 
substantial progress in the interdiction of terrorist funds. A possible policy solution 
could combine trans-border withholding taxes on transactions with unregulated high-
wealth clients, supported by the establishment of a bank-based system for low-cost 
money transfers by emigrants. However, this would require a clear concept of 
‘legitimate’ SDMs unless they are all to be branded as terrorists by the incumbent 




2. ANTECEDENTS FOR THE INTERDICTION OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERS 
 
Money laundering and the international banking system 
Mechanisms to interdict terrorist financing have been built upon the foundations of 
those already established for the prevention of financial crime including money 
laundering. Existing multi-lateral regulation bodies such as the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) of the G7, Interpol and the United Nations have long been involved in 
attempts to coordinate reactions to all forms of trans-border financial crime (Johnson, 
2001). In the immediate aftermath of September 2001, it thus appeared that that the 
most effective way to counter this threat was to redirect and intensify the efforts of 
already existing multi-lateral monitoring and coordination bodies.  
 
In the ‘formal sector’ of international banking, the weakest link appears to be the 
essentially self-regulated international network of correspondent banks.  International 
correspondent banking exists in order that banks may provide a wide range of 
alternate services for their clients in territories where they have no established 
branches.  This in turn makes these formal financial institutions vulnerable to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 5 
   
unwitting collusion in money laundering activities. This problem is most evident 
when international correspondent banks engage partners domiciled in poorly 
regulated emerging market countries.  These arrangements allow the transfer of both 
illegally and legally derived money from the unregulated into the regulated financial 
institutions, thus “allowing funds in through the backdoor of the regulated institutions 
to commence or continue the laundering process” (Johnson, 2001 p.130).  
 
For banks, attempts to detect and interdict terrorist financing are dealt with through 
existing mechanisms to counter money laundering. However, while most money 
laundering funds derive from other criminal offences, such as the sale of illegal drugs, 
the source of terrorist funds are frequently legal. The banking sector is aware that any 
action which would be able to limit terrorist financing would require cooperation 
between banks, between governments and between banks and governments. This 
cooperation would take the form of information sharing and the creation of new 
mechanisms to track suspicious behaviour. A group of twelve leading international 
banks agreed to the ‘Wolfsberg Principles’ for self-regulation in October 2000.
4  
These principles were established with assistance from Transparency International (an 
anti-corruption NGO), and focus on increased due diligence on the part of the banks. 
In particular, they are expected to be more aware of their customers and their actions. 
The ‘Wolfsberg Group’ extended their principles to meet the new concern of terrorist 
financing, increasing the due diligence expected from their members. 
 
Various United Nations agencies were also previously involved in combating 
financial crime in general and terrorist funding in particular. Existing UN resolutions, 
such as the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, were used as a starting point for new action. The perception of new threats 
gave greater importance to the ratification of existing legislation. Additionally, the 
UN Security Council and General Assembly have adopted resolutions calling upon all 
nations to act to stop terrorism and its supporters in all ways. The most powerful of 
these resolutions, detailing measures to be taken to suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts is Security Council Resolution 1373. The UN called for increased cooperation 
from all member states to stop acts of terrorism and the means by which terrorist 
actions were supported.  
 
Multilateral monitoring and policy proposing organizations such as the FATF were 
already concerned with financial crime, in particular money laundering.  The FATF 
was founded in 1989 to coordinate policies against the misuse of the financial system 
by money laundering.
 5  Now including 29 member states and several regional 
affiliated bodies, it monitors the actions of member states in implementing anti-money 
laundering policy and promoting such policies around the world. Its ‘Forty 
Recommendations’ delineate measures for law enforcement agencies, banks and 
governments. These recommendations are designed to be widely applied, providing 
flexibility for individual states to apply them in their own jurisdictions. The FATF 
recommendations are composed of several sections, including the criminalisation of 
laundering money from crime, the requirement of banks to know their clients, and 
reporting any suspicious transactions to their governments. The FATF not only 
contributes to monitoring but also provides a platform for information sharing among 
law enforcement and regulatory officials from member states and international 
organizations. At these annual meetings, member regulators discuss advances changes 
in money laundering and new ways to counteract it.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 6 
   
 
 
Informal financial systems 
Multilateral bodies such as the FATF, although principally concerned with the 
integrity of the international banking system, have also expressed considerable 
concern about global money transfer networks (MTNs), particularly unregulated or 
‘informal’ MTNs such as the hawala system. The regulatory problems they raise are 
complex, both because it is very difficult to trace the activities of these networks 
accurately, and because it is unclear how to regulate them even in principle. The 




All informal MTNs share a common set of operational characteristics, a “lack of 
records, customer identification or regulatory oversight, and the potential for misuse 
by criminals”.
7  Those most commonly referred to are the Chinese chit or chop system 
of East and Southeast Asia, the black market peso exchange system of Latin America, 
and the hawala system, with its offshoot the hundi system in South Asia. Mirroring 
established migrant labour patterns, these networks provide unregulated (and thus 
cheaper) remittance services between developed and developing countries. 
Unregulated small-scale money transfer networks are also used to transfer funds 
between commercial parties both within and across national borders.
8 The final 
settlement between the associate hawaladars may be made through various 
mechanisms such as bank transfers, reciprocal remittances, manipulation of trade 
invoices, smuggling of gold or drugs, or through the physical movement of cash by 
trusted couriers.  Informal MTNs are often held to be ‘archaic’ or ‘underground’ 
financial systems (Gilligan, 2001). However, such networks are better viewed as a 
structural response to information asymmetries in the financial services market place 
and a necessary feature of segmented financial systems (Nawaz et al., 2002). This 
explains why these networks thrive: they are used predominantly by those consumers, 
particularly the poor, who are not served by formal financial institutions because of 
cost and risk. Specifically, they provide a rapid, reliable and relatively cheap means 
for migrant workers to remit cash to poor and illiterate families. 
 
Given that migrant remittances provide the ‘base load’ for such systems, informal 
MTNs have two further advantages over the formal financial system.  First, they 
avoid the additional costs imposed by regulation of banks, for prudential as well as 
policing purposes. The introduction of international codes and standards by the G7 
through the Financial Stability Forum, as well as increased consumer protection, has 
led to increased costs for banks which are passed on as transactions fees.
9  This makes 
the international transfer of relatively small sums highly unattractive to banks.  
Second, hawala networks circumvent the record keeping that formal banking 
involves. Thus they provide the highly valued ‘financial’ service of customer 
confidentiality similar to that offered by offshore financial centres – particularly for 
the transactions of wealthy individuals with highly regulated OECD countries. 
Although hawala networks rely on traditional forms of personal trust rather than 
written contracts, they also use formal banking systems and continually respond to the 
ongoing process of financial globalisation. For example, they are well suited to new e-
commerce platforms and form a key element of international ‘cyber-laundering’ 
business along with activities such as gambling (Philippsohn, 2001).   
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Offshore financial centres 
International capital mobility makes criminal and terrorist funds transfer easier, 
particularly since these transactions can be obscured by the quasi-legal flows related 
to tax evasion, which require a similar degree of secrecy. The role of the tax factor in 
determining business location gives rise to wasteful tax competition for investment, 
particularly between small developing countries with a small business sector of their 
own, for whom the positive externalities of such investment are a significant source of 
national income, but who do not bear the externalities involved in terms of tax loss to 
other countries (UNCTAD, 1995).  The deregulation of cross-border capital flows 
also reduces or even eliminates the information about investors generated by licensing 
systems.  Liberalisation also reduces the transactions cost of the use of off-shore 
financial centres (OFCs) to channel cross-border capital flows through the 
incorporation of offshore holding companies.  The object here is not so much to 
attract foreign investment as such, but rather the administration of assets and tax 
revenue.  The use of these schemes is detrimental to both the home and host country 
through reduced tax revenues and distorted investment inflows (OECD, 1998).  
 
The number of double taxation agreements has thus increased rapidly in recent 
decades, and there are now some two thousand such treaties in existence.  The 
principle of information exchange between national tax authorities has been intrinsic 
to such treaties since the last century; and was central to the draft tax convention 
prepared by the League of Nations in 1935 (IBFD, 1998).  These treaties become 
ineffective if offshore centres are used as transfer pricing points as well as for tax 
avoidance (JTC, 1999).  The OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters established in 1988 ensures that information 
on such holding is shared between OECD members – but not with non-members.   
 
Extensive transfer pricing and tax-induced capital restructuring (e.g. intra-firm debt) 
take place despite the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2000). A significant problem associated with 
this issue is that of offshore financial centres. By allowing multinationals, through 
transfer pricing, to declare the majority of their profits in shell companies registered in 
OFCs, the tax revenues resulting from investment and production in (non-OFC) 
countries are lost to the hosts.  The Financial Stability Forum (FSF, 2000) has 
addressed the issue of OFCs from the point of view of systemic instability in 
international capital markets. Those centres unable or unwilling to adhere to 
international supervisory standards of cooperation and transparency pose two serious 
problems. First, there are prudential concerns for the effective supervision of 
international financial intermediaries in order to forestall a bank collapse from putting 
the payments system in danger. Second, there are market integrity concerns relating to 
the effectiveness of international enforcement efforts in respect of illicit activity and 
abusive market behaviour. 
 
There are thus substantial global welfare losses from OFCs to be set against the 
marginal benefits to small economies with no other legal source of high income other 
than perhaps tourism.  These losses are composed of the loss of fiscal revenue to other 
jurisdictions where firms’ and individuals’ economic activities take place on the one 
hand, and the cover that tax evasion flows give to money laundering, narcotics 
funding – and now terrorist finance – on the other (UN, 1998).  IMF research on the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 8 
   
prudential issues raised suggests that “OFCs attract funds because they promise 
anonymity and the possibility of tax avoidance or evasion. A high level of bank 
secrecy is almost invariably used as a selling point by OFCs, some of which have 
been (and are) exploited also for activities related to money laundering” (Errico and 
Muslaem, 1999, p. 10).   
 
The Financial Action Task Force (OECD 2000) initially defined some thirty-five 
jurisdictions as ‘non-cooperative countries or territories’ in key areas of transparency 
and information exchange required to meet international anti-money laundering 
standards for – a list which included the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, 
St Vincent & Grenadines, Dominica and Panama in the region as well as Israel, 
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Philippines and Russia. Six, including Bermuda and the 
Caymans, rapidly made commitments to eliminate harmful practices by the end of 
2005. In the wake of global anti-terrorist measures after September 2001, the 
remaining Caribbean states and UK dependencies (and the Channel Islands) in the 
region had signed by February 2002; embracing international standards for 
transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition (FSF, 2000).  It 
remained to be seen, however, how effective the information exchange is in practice, 
because this would mean that OFCs would lose most of their financial services 




3. INTERVENTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM DURING THE FIRST 
YEAR OF THE ‘WAR ON TERRORISM’. 
 
The Financial Action.Task Force 
Most of the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of September 11 involved the 
restructuring of existing bodies to meet this new threat.  In October 2001, the 
Financial Action Task Force expanded its mandate from narcotics-related money 
laundering to include terrorist financing. Its existing mandate apparently made it 
particularly suitable to prevent the misuses of world financial system by terrorists. 
Following this, the FATF issued a series of special recommendations to be adopted by 
member states. These recommendations drew upon the content of the ‘Forty 
Recommendations’ but were more closely concerned with terrorist funding. The 
seven parts of the new FATF guidelines include the criminalisation of terrorist 
funding and connected money laundering, followed by the seizing and confiscating of 
terrorist assets.
10 States should also increase cooperation, sharing information and 
assisting others in bringing financial criminals to justice. However, relatively little 
thought has apparently been given yet to implementation, with decisions instead being 
left up to individual member states for the time being. The FATF has yet to develop 
interpretations based on the experience of member states: effectively is still at the data 
gathering stage. 
 
The FATF recommendations are intended to separate the legal and necessary actions 
of remittances and the donation of money to non-profit organizations on the one hand 
from the illegal acts of financial crime and support of terrorist activities on the other. 
Unlike more traditional money laundering, in which crime has already taken place 
before the money is transferred, the origins of terrorist financial support may be 
completely legal, until they enter terrorist financial channels. Informal channels such QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 9 
   
as hawala are used legally by many to transmit their remittances to their home 
countries, as well as providing a conduit for terrorist support. As a result, these 
transactions are both more difficult to track and risk impeding legal financial 
transfers. Since these transfers are by nature informal, there is no “paper trail” for 
investigators to follow. In an attempt to curtail an activity that seems unregulatable, 
the FATF recommendations suggest promoting alternative means for transferring 
money and increasing the number of documents kept on transactions. Additionally, 
wire transfer operators have been asked to keep additional records of transactions and 
to attach all information of sender and recipient at all points in the transaction.
11 At 
the same time, the recommendations call upon those who conduct any transactions – 
including large cash operations such as gambling - to ‘know their customers’ and to 
attach this identification material to the transfer. The lack of this information is seen 
as suspicious and is liable to be reported – but the effectiveness of this measure 
remains to be seen.  
 
The FATF is a monitoring, coordinating multi-lateral organization, but its means are 
limited to cope with its new mandate. After the October 30 2001 statement of the 
Special Principles on Terrorism, the FATF released documents to help states identify 
suspicious activities. The first step in the FATF monitoring procedure involved a self-
assessment questionnaire to all member states, to track their progress in implementing 
these new guidelines.
12  Subsequently non-member states were been invited to fill out 
this questionnaire also. This questionnaire is designed not only to determine if states 
have been implementing the guidelines but also to provide case studies for other states 
to follow in their policy design. Drawing upon the results of some of the 
questionnaires, the FATF produced guidance notes to help financial institutions do 
avoid becoming the unwitting conduit for terrorist funds.
13   
 
Other multilateral action 
The G7 itself also took action to increase information sharing and cooperation in 
broader measures to fight financial crime. While the impetus for these actions is 
relatively new, it draws upon previous anti-money lending and anti-drug smuggling 
agreements. At the G8 meeting of May 13-4 2002, measures were taken to increase 
cooperation across borders, particularly in electronic communications and e-
commerce, in an attempt to stop terrorists from abusing the system
14.  
 
In November 2001, the wider G20 group of leading developed and developing 
countries adopted an action plan to increase cooperation among states and with 
international institutions to adopt measures necessary to limit international terrorist 
funding. According to this plan, all states would ratify the existing conventions and 
resolutions dealing with terrorist financing; collectively they would draw up lists of 
offending groups so that their assets could be frozen and information would be shared 
to make action possible.
15 Liaising with the FATF and other international actors, 
common standards limiting terrorist financing were to be implemented. Also, more 
developed countries promised financial support and assistance to those states that 
lacked the infrastructure to carry out these missions effectively. Aside from multi-
lateral agreements from groups such as the G7, ASEAN and others, multi-lateral 
designations of terrorist suspects remain the most noticeable sign of this cooperation. 
The United States has used the medium of joint declarations of terrorists and terrorist-
supporting groups to promote cooperation in this effort.
16  
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 10 
   
Additionally US officials pointed to the willingness of other states to issue 
designations of terrorist supporting groups on their own and with US support.
17 These 
declarations and the negotiation required to agree upon them, formed a key part of 
this cooperation.  However, the United States itself did not comply with the first item 
of the FATF recommendation list: to ratify the 1999 UN Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorist Financing.  Indeed, only seven OECD member states had 
ratified the convention (Austria, Canada, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the United Kingdom) by mid-2002.
18  The European Union was quick to support the 
US led actions to stop the flow of funds that support terrorist activities and issued 
three separate lists of designated terrorist supporters whose assets should be blocked 
by end-2001. However, the legal and financial infrastructure appear to be inadequate 
to implement these decisions, and only the UK froze significant sums.
19 
 
Meanwhile, informal financial transactions systems such as hawala networks have 
been the subject of increased regulation and anti-money laundering declarations. 
While states such as the UAE have not banned hawala, it is important that they are 
seen to be participating in the international struggle against terrorism. In May 2002 at 
Abu Dhabi, representatives from regional banking and law enforcement agencies 
called for the application of the FATF regulations to the hawala industry, declaring 
that “the international community should continue to work individually and 
collectively to regulate the hawala system for legitimate commerce and to prevent its 
exploitation or misuse by criminals and others”, and that to this end, they should 
“designate competent supervisors to monitor and enforce the application of the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force to hawala dealers and other 
alternative remittance providers.”
 20 The proposals to regulate hawala stems from the 
positive aspects of this system and the fear that any attempt to eliminate informal 
channels would merely drive more transactions underground. In May 2002, the 
Central Bank of the UAE announced that hawala operators in the UAE would be 
licensed and regulated.
21  Pakistan has launched a scheme to convince its nationals to 
avoid unofficial channels, including novel incentives such as baggage allowances and 
preferential treatment at airports.
22   
 
The campaign to interdict terrorist financing seems to demonstrate the value of 
intergovernmental cooperation. However, many measures taken recently are 
commitments rather than action. While it is too soon to determine how successful the 
adopted measures have been, success seems limited mainly to unilateral action within 
the United States and the United Kingdom.  To ensure the wholehearted participation 
of other member countries of the OECD, and of leading emerging market countries, 
would require that they have a more effective share in decision making by 
international bodies. To the extent that that the proposal for fiscal compliance 
incentives discussed below were to be implemented, this would also provide a 
stronger economic motive for governments of small or poor countries to participate 
more effectively in the suppression of terrorism. 
 
Unilateral Intervention 
The US response to terrorist financing was probably the swiftest and most wide 
ranging. The October 2001 the Patriot Act includes several amendments to the bank 
secrecy act and new anti-money laundering measures.
23 Within the Patriot Act, Title 
III is the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing 
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government agency responsible for determining policy on terrorist financing. The 
American Banking Association (ABA) has cooperated with this agency to introduce 
new practices to reduce money laundering. In February 2002, the ABA announced 
new procedures to reduce the threat of terrorists misusing the US banking structures, 
including new checks for the opening of bank accounts.
24  However, the ABA has 
also challenged certain aspects of the Patriot Act, claiming that new provisions for 
cooperation between the government and the banks might impinge upon existing 
agreements of ongoing information sharing.
25 They fear that the creation of new 
channels might circumvent older ones and even make information sharing more 
difficult, and that the time restrictions on reporting are unrealistic. 
 
The US Treasury has devoted substantial resources to waging the financial war on 
terrorism. The initial step was to identify the terrorists and terror-supporting groups 
and to freeze their assets. The next was the regulation of charities to ensure that 
money intended for legitimate purposes was not used to support terrorism. US 
officials leading the fight against terrorist financing thus announced a second phase of 
attack: informal money transfer systems including hawala and charitable donations. 
The Secretary of the Treasury announced: “ We are driving the terrorists out of the 
modern financial infrastructure and into less efficient transfer methods, which are 
more difficult, slower and more easily intercepted by law enforcement.”
26   The 
designation of Islamic charities abroad as supporting terrorists and blocking of their 
resources has also been a US-led initiative, and include the Saudi decision to require 
charities to report to the foreign ministry about charities abroad, more regulation and 




The British government has a substantial history of anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorist financing actions, but a new terrorist finance team was set up in November 
2001, bringing together different interested agencies.
28 The British Government had 
begun to take actions against terrorist financing since 1992, but after September 11, 
the assets of 100 organizations and over 200 individuals were frozen. New anti-
terrorist legislation increased the powers of the police to monitor and seize assets of 
those suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities and increased the requirements of 
banks to report suspicious activities.
29  According to its own progress report in April 
2002, the UK was already compliant with most of the FATF recommendations and 
was seeking to pass legislation that would satisfy the remaining recommendations. 
The banks and financial services industry has also taken the initiative to introduce 
stricter controls over anti-money laundering system. In July 2002, the major UK 
banks announced that they would identify suspicious accounts established since 1994, 
before international regulations require.
30 
 
It would seem therefore, that unilateral intervention has been more effective than 
multilateral action. On the one hand, as New York and London are the only truly 
global financial centres, to deny their use to terrorist groups is a major achievement. 
On the other hand, most of the rest of the world – non-OECD countries and offshore-
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4. IMPACT OF TERRORIST INTERDICTION ON THE FUNDING OF SELF 
DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS 
 
The inclusion of SDMs in the interdiction of terrorist funds   
The impact of the global attempts to curtail terrorist financing and its effect on SDMs 
is not entirely clear.  Many SDMs were placed on a variety of terrorist financing lists 
compiled by the US, the EU and the UN – although not consistently. Moreover, it is 
impossible to discern how much effect these indictments have had on self-
determination groups and their ability to gain funding. There fact that these initiatives 
have not had much success against al Qaeda does not necessarily imply less impact on 
SDMs, because the latter by virtue of their extent and territorial base are easier to 
detect and thus interdict.   
 
The global war against terrorism has resulted in a blurring of the definition between 
terrorism and self-determination as many countries have sought to brand their 
domestic and international opposition in acceptable terms. Since the United States 
seeks the assistance of allies to stop the flows of money that enable terrorism, it has 
expanded the scope of thee mission, which was initially limited closely to al Qaeda 
and its actions. In all, 208 countries and jurisdictions expressed support for the 
financial aspect war on terror. Of these, 166 have issued orders freezing assets of 
terrorist organizations – usually including their domestic armed opposition if one 
exists. 
31 The global war on terror is to some extent based on inter-state reciprocity, 
that is, the US seeks the assistance of other states in its fight against al Qaeda and a 
possible intervention in Iraq. In turn it is willing to support the anti-terrorist actions of 
other states.  
 
Initially, the placing of names on the “list” thus concerned al Qaeda and very closely 
associated groups and individuals. However, then war on terror was expanded: US 
Undersecretary Gurulé insisted in a congressional hearing that “the president's 
mandate has been to go after all terrorist groups, not simply Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban. Our priority has been Al Qaeda, but we have focused as well on other 
terrorist groups, such as ETA and the IRA.”
32   The US willingness to expand the 
number of enemies can be seen as a side payment to allies or those whom it sought as 
allies. As long as those allies were willing to participate in blocking resources and 
sharing of information, the US was willing to add the names of unrelated groups.  In 
the process many groups connected to a wide variety of SDMs were added to the list.  
 
The US and its European allies had different responses to international terrorist 
groups. US attempts to use extraterritorial powers to stop terrorist financing have 
made the FATF and the EU impose stricter policies on the freezing of assets and 
financial sanctions.
33 Initially, the global war on terrorist financing was mainly US-
led with little allied involvement. As of April 2002, the US had listed 165 names of 
groups and individuals out of a total of 192, while Spain had added 21 groups, and the 
UK, six groups.
34 EU member states were very unwilling to extend the blocking of 
assets to non-al Qaeda groups – that is. SDMs. EU rules on interdicting terrorist 
financing require that groups in question be placed on the United Nations list of 
terrorist organizations, a law that the US has asked its European allies to change.
35  
 
The interdiction of terrorist financing has clearly had substantial effect on financing of 
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terrorism as was desired. The US Treasury has announced that terrorist fund-raising is 
now less efficient.
36 However, these groups still find sources of funds to support their 
actions. In general, indicted groups have been forced to turn to other, often more 
illegal sources of funding. Thus, instead of appealing to political supporters, they 
become more involved in other illegal activities such as drug trafficking and 
smuggling. Seizure of their assets makes them turn increasingly to other ways of 
transporting their assets. Thus instead of using banks or even informal means of 
transferring money, they are increasingly using diamonds and gold to finance their 
activities. By being driven more underground, it becomes even more difficult for 
finances to be checked.  
 
The US maintains 4 different list detailing terrorist sponsors. Firstly, the list of states 
that sponsor terrorist acts. Next, the list of foreign terrorist organizations, which lists 
29 of these organizations. While the assets of these groups are frozen and members 
are likely to be refused entry into the US, the assets of supporters may not be seized.
37 
Two new lists, created after September 11, extend  the powers of the previous act. The 
terrorist-financing list consists of a list of groups, individuals and companies involved 
in conducting and supporting terrorist activities. The assets of any group or individual 
on this list are to be frozen but immigration restrictions are under the rubric of another 
list, the Terrorist exclusion list. This list forms a part of the PATRIOT Act and 
includes suspected terrorist organizations and groups, whose members could be 




Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland were not initially part of the focus of the 
financial war on terror, even though some of the terrorist groups were previously 
banned in the US. On October 31, 2001, the US banned the Real IRA
39; and on 
December 31, 2001, five Unionist and republican groups were added to the US 
financial sanctions against terrorist groups. These included Continuity IRA (CIRA), 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), Orange Volunteers, Red Hand Defenders (RHD) and 
the Ulster Defence Association (a.k.a. Ulster Freedom Fighters).
40  Paramilitary 
groups such as the IRA, Real IRA, UVF, and UDA are increasingly involved in 
organized crime to fund their activities. These crimes provide a growing bulk of their 
resources. A House of Commons committee reported that the IRA and the Real IRA 
are involved in such activity. In particular, up to 80% of the involvement of the Real 
IRA on the British mainland is organized crime, rather than terrorist activities per 
se.
41  In its 2002 threat assessment, the UK government claimed significant progress 
in disrupting terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. This progress, the disruption of 42 
out of 79 criminal groups, took the form of arresting members of these groups and 
successful prosecution
42. However, the connection between terrorist groups and other 
organized crime is concerning. It is possible that illegal activities such as drug 
dealing, money laundering, and fuel smuggling are being undertaken by larger groups. 
Nearly half of all organized crime groups are connected with or controlled by 
paramilitary organizations.
43 Organized crime provides much of the funding for this 
groups and there are increasing connections between these groups both within 
Northern Ireland and around the world.  
 
Initially, the LTTE in Sri Lanka were not a part of the US-led global war on terrorism, 
so they were not included on the new terrorist financing list and not part of the 
primary focus.
44 The LTTE
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believed to get a substantial amount of their funding from the Tamil diaspora; in 
particular, Tamil charities in Canada have been cited for their funding of such 
activity. The Sri Lankan Government believed that the Tamil population in Canada 
was the largest source of funds for the self-determination movement.
46 While the 
LTTE had been banned in the US from 1997, they were only added to the terrorist list 
by Canada in November 2001. This freezing of assets may be part of the reason why 
negotiations were finally progressing in the summer of 2002.  
 
In Burma/Myanmar, the ruling junta used the excuse of terrorism to continue to 
repress the opposition. They used the rhetoric of the global war on terror to continue 
to sideline the opposition. With the US emphasis on the war on terrorism, less 
attention has been paid to the issues of drug production and smuggling.
47 The 
government remains on the FATF list of non-cooperative countries and territories, 
which includes states that have refused to comply adequately with the FATF efforts to 
stop money laundering. 
48 But since Myanmar is a member of ASEAN and had 
accepted the ASEAN joint statement on measures to counteract terrorism, it is likely 
to play a somewhat larger role in the global fight against terrorist financing, but likely 
using these actions to its own benefit. The United Wa State Army, has been funded by 
exports of methamphetamine and heroin.
49 
 
The Turkish Government has also used the framework of international terrorism to 
continue to limit the funding of the Kurdish self-determination movements. Turkey 
was one of the few states to have had a specific anti-terrorism law prior to September 
2001.
50 At the same time, as a part of its EU candidacy, Turkey has changed its laws, 
eliminating the ban on Kurdish language and protecting the human rights of Kurds. 
Some Kurdish self determination groups were already considered to be terrorist 
groups prior to September 11 and they were some of the first non-al Qaeda groups to 
be included on the US terrorism list. The PKK earned some of its funding from 
taxation of drug shipments and the protection of drug traffickers.
51 In October 2001, 
Dev sol and the PKK were added to the list.
52 Both of these groups had been listed in 
previous US reports on global terrorism. Additionally, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM or ETIP) was added to the US list of terrorist groups on September 
3, 2002.
53 In 2002, the PKK changed its name to KADEK and announced that it 
would reform into a politically oriented group. However, it retained the same 
leadership and the US government continued to see it as a threat to security and 
American interests.
54 Thus in December, the US government added three names to the 
listing of the PKK, the result of cooperation with the Turkish government in other 
aspects of the war on terrorism and a potential intervention in Iraq. 
55 
 
The Colombian FARC was added to the EU terrorism list in June of 2002, conversely 
the FARC has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US for many years.  
The ELN and the FARC were listed on listed October 31 2001.
56 These SDMs are 
involved in the protection of drug growers at least and probably production and 
trafficking as well, so international illegal activity provides the bulk of their funding. 
The US has given substantial military aid to the Bogota government because in 
“Colombia the drug traffickers, the terrorist groups and the illegal self defense groups, 
some of which are terrorist organizations themselves, all carry out the most extreme 
attacks on society. The two major insurgency groups, the FARC and the National 
Liberation Army or the ELN have divided the territory and they are carrying out acts 
of violence against the citizens and public officials. Likewise the paramilitary QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 15 
   
members have raised funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations in 
Northern and Central Colombia.”
57 The attempts at interdiction of terrorist financing 
and drug trafficking in Columbia originated in 1995 when an Executive Order 
imposed sanctions on specific narcotics traffickers.  Since then this has affected “over 
575 businesses and individuals including 10 drug cartel leaders, 230 businesses, and 
335 other individuals. Four of the most notorious Colombian drug cartel leaders were 
identified in the Executive Order itself…Consequences of sanctions against 
Colombian drug cartels have been swift, clear and compelling….In May of 2001, 
more than 60 of these SDNT companies with an estimated annual aggregate income 




There is little evidence to link the SDM of East Timor to “international terrorism”, but 
this is also due to timing since East Timor was already independent prior to the great 
push against terrorist financing. Other self-determination movements in Indonesia, in 
particular Islamic groups have been connected to the global war on terror. However, 
the increased security risk has led to greater concern from Indonesia and Australia, a 
tendency exacerbated by the 2002 attack in Bali. Australia and Indonesia plan to co-
host an international conference on terrorist financing. Indeed, the fight against 
terrorist financing has been a way for many countries to resume closer ties with 
Indonesia, after they were broken after the conflict in East Timor. In the summer of 




In sum, most of the significant SDMs currently active have become subject to the new 
offensive against international terrorism and by strengthened international police 
action virtue of their involvement with narcotics. There are some signs that this 
pressure has been successful in forcing peace negotiations. However, whether lack of 
access to legitimate (e.g. diaspora) sources of support has forced a reliance on 
narcotics traffic is a serious issue for the future.  It should not be forgotten that SDMs 
previously considered as ‘freedom fighters’ supported by the US and Europe such as 
the Mujadeen in Afghanistan, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Contras in 




5.  CREATING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE 
The evidence presented above demonstrates that systemic features of the international 
financial system make limiting conflict finances very difficult.  The reliance on 
existing international financial monitoring arrangements seemed logical, but failed to 
learn from the lessons of past failure.  Above all, the proposed interventions failed to 
create positive economic incentives for compliance in order to counteract the existing 
disincentives for disclosure experienced by financial intermediaries and regulatory 
jurisdictions.  Moreover, even within highly regulated institutional structures, the 
nature of bank secrecy makes the tracking of transactions difficult. With the growth of 
the Internet and the increasing impersonalisation of the banking industry, banks find it 
more difficult to detect suspicious transactions. For many offshore banking 
companies, their very comparative advantage is in high secrecy and minimal records. 
As a result, cooperation faces obstacles from all sides. Indeed, governments are often QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 16 
   
unwilling to share information with banks, expecting instead that banks will act as a 
conduit for information to the government.  
 
By definition, attempts to exercise some form of regulatory control over hawala 
systems imply that these informal networks will become either increasingly 
formalised or they will cease to exist. Either way, any curtailment of the operations of 
informal MTNs is likely to have negative collateral impacts, and in particular upon 
marginalised users of these networks who have little or no access to formal financial 
services.  It would not be desirable to close down these systems – even if it were 
possible - because they help the poor and the small enterprises that provide the bulk of 
employment. There are two logically preferable solutions: to oblige the formal 
banking system to provide these services at low cost to migrants; or to extend existing 
micro-credit systems – which reach these clients at the local level in developing 
countries – to the international level by recognising them as correspondent banks.  
 
In sum, there is no strong economic incentive for financial intermediaries to comply 
in reporting dubious transactions as the probability of conviction is low and fines 
small. There are strong incentives for non-compliance as the sums of money involved 
are large and costs of monitoring are substantial- especially is high-wealth clients 
value secrecy highly.  It is thus necessary to internalise the externalities caused by 
non-compliant institutions and jurisdictions, and make it unprofitable for them to 
handle these transactions – or at least to make it so expensive that the resources 
available to criminals and terrorists are significantly reduced thereby. 
 
A logical solution to this problem could be to shift from the present ‘blacklist’ system 
such as that administered by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control to an equivalent 
‘whitelist’ system based on persons or firms registered for tax purposes (and thus 
monitored) in OECD countries and qualified emerging markets. Transactions with 
compliant jurisdictions (that is, one sharing full information with OECD member 
countries) made by persons or firms not properly registered for tax purposes would 
then be subject to a substantial withholding tax.
60 This would create a strong incentive 
against dealing with unregulated agents. This would have three strong positive effects: 
first, it would make handling unregistered funds unprofitable – or at worst cost 
criminals a great deal to transact, reducing their liquidity and eroding their assets. 
Second, the process of levying the tax would provide a steady information flow on the 
pattern of payments not now available. Third it would mean effective closure of tax 
havens and a large increase in fiscal resources for both developed countries (to 
balance increased security expenditure) and developing countries to reduce social 
disparities.  The European Community proposal for the taxation of cross-border 
interest payments, the ‘withholding tax directive’, is a precedent that shows that a 
measure of this nature is politically and administratively feasible (EC, 1998). 
 
The concern of OECD members to coordinate measures against tax evasion, 
avoidance and competition between themselves – and the resultant pressure on 
offshore centres – has until now been based mainly on concern for their own tax 
bases.  To extend such cooperative measures towards the main emerging markets 
would be a logical and technically feasible step, particularly since there are strong 
economic arguments for imposing withholding taxes in order to short-term financial 
flows (Zee 1998).  On more general grounds, the leading scholar of international tax 
economics argues that the time has come for the establishment of a ‘world tax QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS96   Page 17 
   
organisation’ that would not impose or collect taxes, but rather support national 
authorities by exercising surveillance on tax systems worldwide; resolving disputes on 
tax competition and developing codes of conduct for tax administration (Tanzi, 1996).  
Supporting the interdiction of criminal and terrorist funds would be a powerful 
additional justification for an overdue international reform. 
 
However, this would leave SDMS in an anomalous position. Clearly incumbent states 
(and some other regional or international powers) have a vested interest in declaring 
internal opposition illegal, particularly when armed conflict is involved. If this is 
automatically ratified internationally, then oppressive regimes are reinforced and 
genuine self-determination becomes virtually impossible – despite being enshrined in 
the UN Charter. Some procedure is probably needed for ‘recognising’ SDMs in the 
way that belligerents are recognised in the international law relating to war. There is 
some precedent for this approach in cases such as the admission of the PLO to 
observer status at the UN. Until this issue is resolved, self-determination movements 
will continue to be drawn into international criminal activity.   
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